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Several countries have experienced a rise in Eurosceptic public opinion since the start of the
ﬁnancial crisis, but what eﬀect does this change in attitudes have on the platforms of political
parties? Christopher Williams presents ﬁndings from a study of party positions in European
Parliament elections. He writes that while some parties do respond to Eurosceptic public opinion by
adopting a more critical stance toward the integration process, this eﬀect is not uniform across all
parties.
Public attitudes towards the process of European integration have become more salient in recent
years. Moreover, there is little doubt that Euroscepticism in European Union member states is on the rise. This begs
the question of what eﬀect these increasing Eurosceptic attitudes have on party politics? In a recent study, I
(alongside my co-author Jae-Jae Spoon) attempt to understand party responsiveness to this aforementioned rising
Euroscepticism in the context of European Parliament elections. We ﬁnd that political parties are responsive to
Euroscepticism, but this eﬀect is not uniform across all parties. Rather some parties change their positions in
response to public Euroscepticism, while other parties do not respond to public Euroscepticism at all.
Party responses to Eurosceptic public opinion
Theoretically, a party’s desire to win elections is expected to lead to responsiveness to public attitudes. At the most
base theoretical level, voters tend to support the party that is closest to their own positions. Thus, if a party’s
positions mirror the positions of the public (often understood as the positions of the median voter), that party will
receive more votes. With this understanding, if parties wish to win elections they will seek more votes, and thus will
change their positions, shifting towards the positions of the public. Therefore, one would expect that political parties
competing in European Parliament (EP) elections would be more Eurosceptic in their positions when a larger
percentage of the public in their member states are Eurosceptic prior to an EP election.
Although this basic theoretical construct seems quite intuitive, the relationship between aggregate public
Euroscepticism and party Euroscepticism is bit more complicated. Political parties vary in a number of regards that
can be expected to condition their level of responsiveness to public attitudes, including public Euroscepticism. Party
characteristics can be expected to aﬀect the goals of political parties. Thus, varying party characteristics may lead to
diﬀerentiated party responsiveness to public attitudes.
Two such party characteristics that may aﬀect party goals and, in turn, party behavior, are the size of a party, and a
party’s status as a member of government. Larger parties tend to be less ideologically driven than smaller parties,
and more concerned with vote maximisation. This results in larger parties being willing to adjust their positions to
attract a larger number of voters.
Take for example the British Conservative party. In recent years, the Tories have become increasingly Eurosceptic
in an attempt to draw in voters that espouse negative opinions towards Britain’s membership in the EU, even
moving for a referendum on the UK’s continued membership. Conversely, smaller parties tend to be ideologically
pure, with many being centred around one or a small number of issues – for example any number of Green parties
throughout Europe, or the Pirate parties that have arisen over the last ten years. With this ideological purity comes
an unwillingness to shift positions simply to maximise votes.
Therefore, it is expected that larger parties would be more responsive to public opinion than would be smaller
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parties. This expectation of greater responsiveness
among larger parties can be applied to the issue of
Euroscepticism in European Parliament elections.
Speciﬁcally, one would expect that larger parties will
be more Eurosceptic than smaller parties at EP
elections when more of the public is Eurosceptic prior
to the election.
The status of a party as a member of the government
or of the opposition may also inﬂuence
responsiveness to public Euroscepticism.
Government parties and opposition parties have
diﬀerent incentive structures at election time. Parties
in government were elected on a slate of policy
positions. Changing positions during an EP election
opens a party up to public fears of insincerity and
claims of “ﬂip ﬂopping”. This makes it less likely that
governing parties will change their positions.
Additionally, governing parties face pressures from
Brussels to toe the line on issues of integration, thus making it particularly unlikely that governing parties will respond
to public Euroscepticism. Therefore, it is likely that opposition parties are more responsive to public attitudes, and
particularly Eurosceptic attitudes than are government parties.
Testing the theory
These expectations are borne out in part by our analysis. Using Euromanifestos Project data from 1989 through
2009 combined with European Election Study data from the same time period, we show that political parties were
not uniformly responsive to public Euroscepticism. When a larger percentage of the population in an EU member
state was Eurosceptic prior to an EP election, political parties in that state were neither more nor less Eurosceptic in
their European Parliament election manifestos. This ﬁnding is not wholly unexpected, as there are theoretical
reasons to believe that party responsiveness to Euroscepticism is conditioned by party characteristics.
Regarding the conditioning eﬀect of party characteristics, we ﬁnd that while the governing status of a party does not
appear to condition the relationship between Euroscepticism prior to EP elections and party positions during EP
elections, larger parties are more responsive than smaller parties to Eurosceptic attitudes. Speciﬁcally, parties that
received a larger vote share in a previous national election tend to be more Eurosceptic during an EP election when
the public is more Eurosceptic prior to that election.
So, what does this mean? First, these ﬁndings have important implications for our understanding of political
responsiveness and democratic legitimacy in the EU. It appears that political parties are, at least somewhat,
responsive to public opinion. This indicates that one of the basic tenets of democracy, namely party responsiveness,
does exist in European Parliament elections. This may assuage some fears that the EU lacks democratic legitimacy.
Second, these ﬁndings inform our understanding of party responsiveness more generally. It is found that party
responsiveness is not uniform across all political parties, but rather that certain party characteristics inﬂuence party
responsiveness. It is important to keep this in mind when further examining party responsiveness in all contexts, not
only EP elections.
Third, the ﬁnding of party responsiveness in European Parliament elections contributes to our understanding of EP
elections as second-order contests. The ﬁnding that political parties are adjusting their EP election manifestos in
response to public opinion indicates that parties are taking these elections more seriously. This further implies that
EP elections may be shifting away from their second-order status.
2/3
Finally, the ﬁnding that (larger) parties espouse more Eurosceptic positions when the public is more Eurosceptic
may have profound implications for the future of European integration. Taken together with the growing level of
Euroscepticism in the EU and its member states, one could easily interpret these ﬁndings as an indication that in the
future we will see a greater degree of Euroscepticism in the European Parliament. This certainly will inﬂuence
European policy-making and future integration eﬀorts. Further, if these ﬁndings are generalisable beyond EP
elections, and hold true in national elections as well, it is not unreasonable to expect increased opposition to the
process of integration among parties in EU member states, and thus, within the governments of EU member states.
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